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We study information revelation in markets with pairwise meetings. We focus on the one-
sided case and perform a dynamic analysis of a constant entry flow model. The same question 
has been studied in an identical framework in Serrano and Yosha (1993) but they limit their 
analysis  to  the  stationary  steady  states.  Blouin  and  Serrano  (2001)  study  information 
revelation  in a one-time  entry  model  and obtain results different than Serrano  and Yosha 
(1993). We establish that the main difference is not due to the steady state analysis but is due 
to the differences concerning the entry assumption. 
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We can illustrate the general issue of information revelation in market with
pairwise meetings by a parallelism with what we can observe on all the
places of interest in Egypt. On all these places, one observes bargaining
between Egyptians and Tourists. The Egyptians try to sell a guided tour of
the place. The Tourists are the potential buyers. There is neither a central
institution nor a unique public price. The phase of bargaining happens after
a matching between one seller and one buyer. When an Egyptian reaches
an agreement with a Tourist, the two quit the market to eﬀectuate the tour.
In case of disagreement, the two separate and are matched anew with an
agent of the opposite type.
The asymmetric information concerns the interest of the place. It is
not obvious, for a Tourist, if the place has a long history, if there is a
lot of anecdotes about the site. Some Tourists can be uninformed about
the interest while some other ones are informed, for instance, because they
know some friends who previously visited the same place. Of course, all the
Egyptians know the exact interest of the place.
The interest of the place has an inﬂuence on the value and the cost of
the guided tour. It is more interesting to have a guide when there is a lot
of things to say about the site. At the same time, it is more costly for an
Egyptian to guide when the place is interesting, at least because it takes
more time.
We can expect that the good price is higher when the place is of high
interest. It is also natural that the uninformed Tourists try to extract infor-
mation from their matches with diﬀerent partners. This learning is expensive
because there is a waste of time. Naturally, sellers try to exploit their in-
formation’s advantage by misrepresenting. By misrepresenting, sellers incur
also a cost for the same reason, i.e. the waste of time.
The main issue will be to determine if the trading process will imply
an information revelation. Especially when the agents become inﬁnitely pa-
tient, i.e. the market becomes approximately frictionless.
In market with pairwise meetings, the information revelation literature
began with the seminal paper Wolinsky (1990) 1. The model studied in this
paper is more general than ours because there are also some uninformed
1Concerning the market with pairwise meetings with perfect information, there is a sig-
niﬁcant literature studying following the seminal works of Gale, Rubinstein and Wolinsky.
For a review, see Osborne and Rubinstein (2000).
1sellers. In our egyptian story, it would mean that some Egyptians are not
aware of the place’s interest. The main result of Wolinsky (1990) is that
some trades occur at a wrong price according to the state even when market
becomes approximately frictionless.
Gale (1989) conjectures the great importance of the assumption that
uninformed agents are present in the two sides of the market because a
noise is created if the cost of learning decreases. Indeed, the decreasing of
the cost causes the probability - of an uninformed agent to meet another
uninformed agent - to increase. This requires, however, the information
power of meeting to decrease when the cost of learning declines.
Serrano and Yosha (1993) show that Gale’s conjecture is correct. They
use the same model than Wolinsky (1990), but they assume that all sellers
are informed. The noise force disappears, since uninformed buyers always
meet informed sellers. Finally, Serrano and Yosha (1993) establish that all
transactions occur at the right price whenever the market becomes approx-
imately frictionless.
Wolinsky (1990) and Serrano and Yosha (1993) use a constant ﬂow entry
model. At each period, a certain number of new agents enter the market.
To simplify the analysis, these papers consider only the stationary steady
states. In other words, they consider the situations where the number of
agreements is exactly equal to the entry ﬂow. Blouin and Serrano (2001)
study the same question of information revelation but in a one-time entry
model2. At the ﬁrst period, all the agents are present and nobody enters the
market in the following periods. They obtain a dramatically diﬀerent result
in the one sided case. They conclude, in this case, that some transactions
occur at wrong prices even when the market is frictionless. The two sided
analysis provides results similar to Wolinsky (1990).
The question is to know whether the diﬀerences of results are due to the
diﬀerence of hypothesis or to the restriction of the analysis to the steady
states in the case of a constant entry ﬂow model. In the case of a constant
ﬂow entry, we can imagine that there is a kind of externality between the
diﬀerent generations of agents, which implies the diﬀerence of the results.
Concerning the restriction to the steady states, it is not unreasonable to
believe that some dynamics are ignored which could explain why full rev-
elation is obtained in Serrano and Yosha (1993) while not in Serrano and
2For a discussion of these two hypothesis (constant entry ﬂow and one time entry)
in the perfect information case see Gale (1987). Generally, the implicit economy in the
constant entry ﬂow model is not well deﬁned. Nevertheless, the constant entry ﬂow model
remains interesting at least because they may correspond better to some real markets.
2Blouin (2001).
This paper studies the same model than Serrano and Yosha (1993) but
assumes an initial period. The model thereby has a starting point outside
a steady-state. As usual in the literature, this paper studies markets which
become approximately frictionless.
A ﬁrst intuition could be that a transition phase will be observed before
the steady-states. The ﬁrst proposition states that such a transition phase
does not exist for the steady-state that implies a complete information rev-
elation. So, the diﬀerences of result between Serrano and Yosha (1993) and
Blouin and Serrano (2001) can not be completely explained by the restricted
analysis used by Serrano and Yosha (1993).
This kind of model often presents a multiplicity of equilibria. One could
then suspect that a steady-state analysis is unable to ﬁnd all these equilib-
ria. Among these ignored equilibria, one can expect to ﬁnd some equilibria
without complete information revelation. The second proposition shows that
this is not the case, at least if uninformed buyers are suﬃciently suspicious.
In our egyptian story, suﬃciently suspicious would mean that the probabil-
ity that the place is interesting is not considered very high by uninformed
Tourists. Then, the equilibrium about the ﬁrst proposition is the unique
one.
Let’s note that surprisingly the dynamic analysis reduces the number of
equilibria rather than adds some new ones. Some of the steady-state cannot
be reached from our starting point.
To sum up, we proved the existence and the uniqueness of an equilib-
rium. This equilibrium implies a complete information revelation. So, the
diﬀerence between Serrano and Yosha (1993) and Blouin and Serrano (2001)
is due to the diﬀerence of modeling and not to the restriction of the analysis
to the steady-states in Serrano and Yosha (1993).
In the ﬁrst section, we present the model. The second section delineates
some characterizations of the equilibria that are useful in the next sections.
The third section introduces the ﬁrst proposition. The second proposition
is presented and proved in the last section.
31 The model
We consider the model of Serrano and Yosha (1993) without modifying it
but we study the outcomes without assuming an a priori stationarity of the
equilibrium.
Times runs discretely from 0 to ∞3. Each period is identical. On one
side, there are sellers who have one unit of indivisible good to sell. On the
other side, there are buyers who want to buy one unit of this good. In each
period, a continuum of measure M of new sellers and the same quantity
of buyers enter on the market. The sellers’ number which arrive on the
market is equal to the buyers’ one. The agents quit the market when they
have traded. Hence, the number of sellers is always equal to the number of
buyers.
There exist two possible states of the world which inﬂuence on the payoﬀ
of the agents. If the state is low (L), the cost of production (cL) for the
sellers but also the utility (uL) of the buyers are low. If the state is high
(H), the corresponding parameters (cH and uH) are high. The state remains
identical during all the periods.
All sellers know the state of the world, whereas not all buyers are per-
fectly informed about the state of the world. Among the new comers, there
is a part xB of buyers which is perfectly informed. The remaining buyers
are uninformed and possess a common prior belief αH ∈ [0,1] that the state
is H and (1 − αH) that the state is L.
At each period, all the agents are randomly matched with an agent of
the other type. At each meeting, the agents can announce one of two prices
: pH and pL. If both agents announce same price, trade occurs at this price.
If a seller announces a lower price, trade occur at an intermediate price pM.
If a seller announces a higher price, trade does not occur. The diﬀerent
parameters are assumed to be ordered such that :
cL < pL < uL < pM < cH < pH < uH (1)
Staying on the market implies a zero payoﬀ. The instantaneous payoﬀ when
a trade occurs is the price minus the cost for a seller and the utility minus
the price for a buyer. All agents discount the future by a constant factor δ.
In state H, we call pH the good price because trade at other prices
implies a loss for the sellers. Similarly, the price pL is the good price in state
3Serrano and Yosha 1993 consider that times runs from −∞ to ∞. To make the steady
state analysis, it is suﬃcient to assume that the initial conditions are the values of the
steady state. This approach is totally equivalent to the approach of Serrano and Yosha
1993.
4L because trade at other prices involves loss for the buyers.
After each meeting with a seller who announces pH, a buyer will actualise
his belief αH according to Bayes’rule. If an uniformed buyer meets a seller
who announces pL, he knows that state is L but it does not really matter
since this buyer will trade and leave the market.
It is convenient to say that a seller (resp. a buyer) plays soft when he
announces pL (resp. pH) and tough when he announces the pH (resp. pL).
When an agent plays soft, he is ensured to trade and to quit the market. So,
to describe completely the strategy of an agent, it is suﬃcient to give the
number of periods in which he plays tough. The strategy of an agent might
depend on the time of entry on the market. We note nSH(t) the number
of periods during which a seller plays tough when he enters in time t on a
market which is in state H. Similarly, we deﬁne nSL(t), nBH(t), nBL(t) and
nB(t). Naturally, the strategy of an uninformed buyer nB(t) is independent
of the state of the world.
We deﬁne now the proportions of agents who play tough when state is L.
The proportion of the total number of buyers in the market who at period
t announce pL is called B(t)4. Similarly, S(t)5 is the proportion of sellers
who at period t announce pH. These values are known to all agents.
An equilibrium is a proﬁle of strategies where each agent is maximizing
his expected payoﬀ, given the strategies of the other agents. All parameters
(pH,pM,pL,cH,cL,uH,uL,xB,δ,αH) are common knowledge.
2 Preliminary results
In this section, some deﬁnitions and preliminary results are introduced.
Those results will be useful in order to prove the two main propositions.
2.1 Trivial strategies
In the following claim, we characterize the equilibrium strategies of sellers
in state H and of informed buyers.
Claim 1 In any equilibrium nSH(t) = ∞, nBL(t) = ∞ and nBH(t) = 0 ∀t.
4In Serrano and Yosha (1993), this proportion is noted B
l
L.
5This proportion is equivalent to S
h
L in Serrano and Yosha (1993)
5Proof An informed seller in state H knows that his payoﬀ will be nega-
tive if he trades at an other price than pH. Since the payoﬀ of perpetual
disagreement is 0, he will always prefer to play tough even if it implies a
long delay before trading. The reasoning is identical for an informed buyer
in state L. An informed buyer in state H will understand that nSH(t) = ∞
and thus he will never trade while he plays tough. Playing tough only de-
lays the payoﬀ. So, it is better for this kind of buyer to play immediately soft.
2.2 Strategy of uninformed buyers
We deﬁne ∆VB(t) which is the diﬀerence of gain between playing soft to-
morrow and playing soft today for an uninformed buyer which enter the
market in period t.
∆VB(t) = ∆VB(S(t),S(t + 1))
= αH(uH − pH)δ
+ (1 − αH)(1 − S(t))(uL − pL)
+ (1 − αH)δS(t)[(uL − pM) + S(t + 1)(pM − pH)]
− [αH(uH − pH) + (1 − αH)[(uL − pM) + S(t)(pM − pH)]](2)
The last line corresponds to the payoﬀ involved by playing soft today. 6
The ﬁrst lines correspond to playing today tough and tomorrow soft7.
If the diﬀerence of gain between playing soft tomorrow and playing soft
today is positive, it is clear that an uninformed buyer will not play soft
today. So, we can state :
Claim 2 Optimal strategies are such that
∆VB(t) > 0 =⇒ nB(t) ≥ 1 (3)
6The payoﬀ in state H which is equal to (uH −p
H) is multiplied by the probability that
the state is H. The term in brackets, which is multiplied by the probability that the state
is L, is naturally the payoﬀ in state L. This payoﬀ can be written (1 − S(t))(uL − p
M)
(i.e. the probability to meet a soft seller times the payoﬀ involved by this meeting) plus
S(t)(uL − p
H) (i.e. the probability to meet a tough seller times the payoﬀ involved).
7The meaning of the ﬁrst line is obvious. It is just important not to forget the discount
factor δ. Indeed, if the state is H, a buyer who announces p
L does not trade. In the
case where the state is L, there is a probability (1−S(t)) that a buyer meets a soft seller
and obtains today (uL − p
L). If a buyer does not have this luck, which happens with
probability S(t), he will have tomorrow an expected payoﬀ equal to the expression in
brackets. Once again, we must not forget the discount factor.
62.3 Characterisation of S(t) at equilibrium
We deﬁne ∆VSL(B(t),B(t + 1)) which is the diﬀerence of gain between
playing soft tomorrow and playing soft today for an informed seller in state
L. This diﬀerence depends on time because B(t) may be non-stationary.
Remark that ∆VSL(B(t),B(t+1) < 0 does not imply that the best solution
is to stop in t.
∆VSL(B(t),B(t + 1)) = (1 − B(t))(pH − cL)
+ B(t)δ[((1 − B(t + 1))(pM − cL) + B(t + 1)(pL − cL)]
− [((1 − B(t))(pM − cL) + B(t)(pL − cL)]
= B(t)

(−pH + pM − pL + cL) + δ(pM − cL)
+ δB(t + 1)(pL − pM)

+ (pH − pM) (4)
In the ﬁrst equality, the two ﬁrst lines correspond to playing tough today
and soft tomorrow while the third one corresponds to playing soft today.8
Assume that a seller stops today playing tough. ∆VSL is a measure of
gain for a seller if he decides to play tough one period more. The measure
of gain for a seller if he decides to play tough T periods more is given by the
sum of succesive ∆VSL balanced in order to take account of discount factor
δ. If there exists a T such that this sum is positive, then playing tough T
periods more gives a higher expected payoﬀ than playing soft today. If this
sum is negative for all T, then the maximum expected payoﬀ is reached by
playing soft today. If the sum is null for a T, then the seller is indiﬀerent
between playing soft today or playing tough T periods more.
8If a seller plays soft today, he has a probability (1 − B) to meet a soft buyer and
consequently to obtain a payoﬀ (p
M − cL), otherwise (i.e. with probability B) he will get
(p
L −cL) due to a meeting with a tough buyer. If a seller announces p
H, he will reach an
agreement only if he is matched with a soft buyer. It occurs with a probability (1 − B)
and the payoﬀ is then (p
H − cL). Otherwise, with a probability B, he will remain in
the market. In the next period, if he plays soft, he has an expected payoﬀ equal to the
expression between brackets which must be multiplied by the discount factor δ because
trade occurs one period later.
7Claim 3 Optimal strategies are such that the sequence S(t) ∈ [0,1] satisﬁes
S(t) = 1 =⇒ ∃ T s.t.
T X
i=0
δi∆VSL(t + i) ≥ 0 (5)
S(t) < 1 =⇒
T X
i=0




δi∆VSL(t + i) > 0 =⇒ S(t) = 1 (7)
T X
i=0
δi∆VSL(t + i) < 0 ∀ T =⇒ S(t) = 0 (8)
3 Existence
The following proposition establishes the existence of a steady state equi-
librium, called E1 in Serrano and Yosha (1993), without convergence phase
when δ is high enough. The novelty compared to Serrano and Yosha (1993) is
the dynamic context of the proof. In other words, there exists, in a dynamic
analysis, an equilibrium with full information revelation9 when market are
suﬃciently frictionless.
Proposition 1 If




uH − pH (9)
then nSL(t) = 0 and nB(t) = 1 ∀t imply an equilibrium.
Proof nSL(t) = 0 implies S = 0. Since no seller misrepresents, once a
buyer has met a seller who announces a state H, he knows that it is useless
to play tough. So, nB can not be higher than one. To see that nB 6= 0, it
is suﬃcient to oberve that ∆VB(0,0) > 0. Hence, nB(t) = 1 is an optimal
strategy given nSL(t) = 0.
The proposed strategies imply B = 1. So, ∆VSL < 0 and the conditions
given by claim 3 are fulﬁlled. Hence, no seller has an incentive to deviate.10
9All the trades occur at the good price.
10This result depends crucially on the fact that an individual deviation does not aﬀect
the value of S and B because agents are negligeable.
84 Uniqueness
The next proposition states that when uninformed buyers are not too op-
timistic about the probability that the state of the world is H, then the
complete revelation equilibrium is the unique one when the market becomes
approximately frictionless.
Proposition 2 If αH <
pH−uL
uH−uL, there exists a ¯ δ such that for all δ > ¯ δ
there is an unique equilibrium described by proposition 1.
It is clear that if S(t) = 0 and nB(t) ≥ 1 for all the periods, the unique
equilibrium is described in proposition 1. The proposition will be proved
by successive claims. The whole proof is relatively tedious even if not re-
ally diﬃcult. The goal of the ﬁrst claim is obvious. The reader could be
desoriented by the next ones. He might be helped by keeping in mind the
ﬁnal goal is to prove S(t) = 0 ∀t under the assumptions of the proposition.
Actually, other possibilities for S(t) are excluded step by step.
The following claim ensures that uninformed buyers are suspicious enough
and prefer to play tough during the ﬁrst period in the market independently
of the strategy of the other agents.
Claim 4 The following condition is suﬃcient to ensure nB(t) ≥ 1 ∀t.
δ ≥
pH − pM − uL + pL
pH − uL




Proof It is obvious that ∆VB ≥ ∆VB(S,1). Clearly, ∆VB(S,1) is a linear
function in S. So, either ∆VB(0,1) or ∆VB(1,1) is the minimum value that
∆VB can take. The second inequality of (10) is equivalent to ∆VB(1,1) >
0. The ﬁrst inequality of (10) is the condition such that ∆VB(1,1) is the
minimal value of ∆VB.
It is usefull to remember that uninformed buyers don’t update their belief
αH when S = 1. Indeed, since they have the same probability (= 1) to meet
a tough seller in the two states of the world, meeting a tough buyer doesn’t
carry any information with respect to the prevalent state of the world.
Claim 5 If the condition of claim 4 is satisﬁed, S(t) = 1 implies B(t+1) =
1.
9Proof The condition of claim 4 ensures that all the newcomers in the
market play tough. Among the buyers present in t + 1 who were already in
the market during the previous period, some are informed and play always
tough. The uninformed buyers who played tough in the previous period have
no reason to decide to play soft since their belief does not change compared
to the previous period. Clearly, the uninformed buyers who played soft in
the previous period are exited. So, there are only buyers playing tough on
the market in period t + 1.
Claim 6 If the condition of claim 4 is satisﬁed and B(t) = 1 then S(t) < 1.
Proof Imagine that S(t) = 1. First, one can see that ∆VSL(B(t),B(t +
1)) < 0. Indeed, according to claim 5, B(t + 1) = 1 sothat playing tough
in period t and soft in the following period simply implies to delay the
instantaneous payoﬀ cL −pL, which is expensive due to the discount factor.
S(t) = 1 implies that ∃T such that
PT
t ∆VSL ≥ 0.
Let’s assume ∃T such that
PT
t ∆VSL > 0, then ∆VSL(B(t),B(t+1)) < 0
implies
PT
t+1 ∆VSL > 0. Hence S(t + 1) = 1 by claim 3. Remark that
S(t+1) = 1 implies ∆VSL(B(t+1),B(t+2)) < 0. So, by recurrence, S = 1
for all the periods between t and T. But then
PT
t ∆VSL < 0 and we have a
contradiction. So, 6 ∃T such that
PT
t ∆VSL > 0.
Let’s now consider the possibility to have T such that
PT
t ∆VSL = 0.
We will prove that this situation cannot exist by proving that ∆VSL(B(t +
1),B(t + 2)) cannot be positive nor negative nor null.
∆VSL(B(t + 1),B(t + 2)) > 0 is impossible. Indeed, it would imply
S(t+1) = 1. But this would imply in turn that ∆VSL(B(t+1),B(t+2)) < 0
as explained above.
∆VSL(B(t + 1),B(t + 2)) < 0 is not possible either. S(t) = 1 and









t+1 ∆VSL since ∆VSL(B(t),B(t+1)) <
0.
It remains to consider a situation in which ∆VSL(B(t+1),B(t+2)) = 0.
S(t) = 1 implies ∃T such that
PT
t ∆VSL = 0. So, for the same T, we have PT
t+1 ∆VSL > 0 and then S(t+1) = 1. Hence, we have a contradiction since
S(t + 1) = 1 implies ∆VSL(B(t + 1),B(t + 2)) < 0.
So, 6 ∃T such that
PT
t ∆VSL = 0.
11It is obvious that S(t + 1) = 0 does not make sens as equilibrium.
10Claim 7 Consider a situation where the condition of claim 4 is satisﬁed.
If 0 < S(t) < 1 and ∆VSL(B(t),B(t + 1)) < 0 then S(t + 1) = 1 and
S(t + 2) < 1. Moreover
∆VSL(B(t),B(t + 1)) + ∆VSL(B(t + 1),B(t + 2)) = 0 (11)
Proof If S(t) > 0, ∃T such that
PT





t ∆VSL = 0. This means that S(t + 1) = 1. By
claim 5, we know that B(t + 2) = 1 and subsequently by claim 6 we have
S(t + 2) < 1.
S(t+2) < 1 implies 6 ∃T such that
PT
t+2 ∆VSL > 0. So, if S(t) > 0 then
equation (11) must be satisﬁed.
Claim 8 If S(0) = 0 then S(t) = 0 ∀t.
Proof If S(0) = 0 then the situation in period 1 is exactly identical to the
situation in period 0 so S(1) = 0. And so on for the following periods.
Claim 9 If the conditionsof claim 4 is satisﬁed, we can not have an equi-
librium with S(0) > 0 and nB(0) ≥ 2.
Proof Condition of claim 4 ensures nB(1) ≥ 1, hence B(0) = B(1) = 1.
Claim 7 implies S(1) = 1. Hence, B(2) = 1 by claim 5. According to claim
7, the equation (11) must be satisﬁed for t = 0 but it is not possible with
B(0) = B(1) = B(2) = 1.
Claim 10 If the condition of claim 4 is satisﬁed and δ > ˜ δ, we can not have
an equilibrium with S(0) > 0 and ∆VSL(B(0),B(1)) = 0. With
˜ δ =
pL − cL
(pM − cL) − (pM − pL)xB
< 1 (12)
Proof From claims 9 and 4, we know nB(0) = 1. So,




S(0) such that ∆VSL(1,
1+S(0)xB
1+S(0) ) = 0 is given by
S(0) =
(1 − δ)(pL − cL)
(pL − cL) − δ(pM − cL) + δ(pM − pL)xB
(14)
The claim is obtained by noting that this expression is negative if δ > ˜ δ.
11Claim 11 Assume that condition of claim 4 is satisﬁed, we can not have
an equilibrium with 1 > S(0) > 0 and nB(0) = 1 when δ > ˜ δ. ˜ δ deﬁned as
above.
Proof Since nB(0) = 1, B(1) is given by equation (13). By claim 7,
S(1) = 1 hence B(2) = 1.
S(0) such that ∆VSL(1,
1+S(0)xB
1+S(0) ) + ∆VSL(
1+S(0)xB
1+S(0) ,1) = 0 is equal to
2(1 − δ)(pL − cL)
pH − pL − (1 − δ)(pM − cL) + [(1 − δ)(pM − pL + cL) − pH + δpL]xB
> 0(15)
Clearly, if δ > ˜ δ, this expression is larger than the one given by the equation
(14). Observe that ∆VSL(1,
1+S(0)xB
1+S(0) ) = 0 is increasing in S(0). Hence,
∆VSL(1,
1+S(0)xB
1+S(0) ) with S(0) given by (15) is positive. It is a contradiction
with the fact that S(0) < 1.
Claim 12 If the condition of claim claim 4 is satisﬁed and δ > ˜ δ then
S(t) = 0 ∀t at equilibrium.
Proof Claims 9, 10 and 11 ensure S(0) = 0 if δ > ˜ δ. The result for the
following periods is obtained by claim 8.
For the proposition, take ¯ δ = max(˘ δ, ˜ δ).
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